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Does Consistency Predict Accuracy of Beliefs?: Economists Surveyed About PSA 
For judged probabilities to be considered adequate, or rational, internal 
consistency is not enough. –Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1130). 
 
It appears that a minimal requirement of rationality is that one not hold beliefs 
that are contrary to objectively available data,  coupled with logical, statistical, 
or mathematical reasoning. -- Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2009, p. 290) 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
We told125 male attendees at the 1996 ASSA meetings in Boston about two widely accepted 
estimates in the medical literature relating to prostate cancer: the unconditional probability of prostate 
cancer among asymptomatic men in their 50s, which is 0.025; and the probability (in the same 
population) of a positive Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA), a commonly used blood test to screen for 
prostate cancer, which is 0.050.  After being informed of these probabilities, we elicited subjective 
beliefs about two related conditional probabilities: the posterior probability of cancer given a positive 
PSA test, denoted P(C|+), and the probability of a positive PSA test conditional on undiagnosed 
prostate cancer, referred to in the medical literature as the sensitivity of the PSA test, denoted P(+|C).1  
Figure 1 summarizes the information provided to subjects about unconditional probabilities of 
the PSA test and of prostate cancer, P(+) = 0.050 and P(C) = 0.025, and the two conditional beliefs 
elicited from subjects (with subscripts indexing individuals subjects), P(C|+)i and P(+|C)i. We invite the 
reader to pause for a moment of introspection: What numerical values would you assign as your best 
estimates of P(C|+) and P(+|C)? The novel aspect of this elicitation of conditional beliefs is that it 
yields a measure of Bayesian consistency without requiring factually accurate beliefs.  Elicited 
conditional beliefs can be completely wrong, yet entirely consistent with the definition of conditional 
probability.  If people vary in the extent to which they adhere to Bayes’ Rule, then would we expect 
this to correlate with other observable features? 
                                                 
1
 Although the medical literature refers to the posterior probability of cancer conditional on a positive test result as the test’s 
positive predictive value, this paper follows convention in economics referring to P(C|+) as the posterior probability. 
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A wide range of voices has remarked upon the centrality and singularity of Bayes’ Rule as both 
a prescriptive and descriptive norm.2  Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2010, p. 1), for example, 
write: “The mode of reasoning most widely used in economic modeling is Bayesian.” Starmer (2000, p. 
377) writes that, before non-additive probability models appeared in the economics literature, 
economists usually took it for granted (and probably continue to take for granted) that the Savage 
Axioms—which guarantee that choice over lotteries can be represented as expected utility 
maximization with respect to a subjective probability distribution conforming to Bayes’ Rule—provide 
the “right model of individual choice.”  Reinhardt Selten (2001,  p. 13) writes that “Modern 
mainstream economic theory is largely based on an unrealistic picture of human  decision  making [in 
which] agents are portrayed as fully rational Bayesian maximizers of subjective utility.”  Camerer et 
al.’s (2003, p. 1214-1215) definition of “full rationality” requires that “people have well-formed beliefs 
about how uncertainty will resolve itself, and when new information becomes available, they update 
their beliefs using Bayes’s law.” According to Aragones et al., (2005, p. 1364), “Most of the formal 
literature in economic theory and in related fields is based on the Bayesian model of information 
processing.” And Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2009, p.287) emphasize the singularity of 
Bayesian information processing (as opposed to a plural toolkit containing multiple procedures for 
reasoning on the basis of data or lack of data), observing that:  “[W]ithin economic theory the Bayesian 
approach is the sole claimant to the throne of rationality.”3 
                                                 
2
 Savage argued for a normative interpretation of expected utility theory while admitting that he himself violated the theory 
when first encountering the pairs of gambles used in Allais’ paradox (Savage, 1954).  See Starmer (2000, 2009) for 
more on normative interpretations of expected utility theory. 
3
 Binmore (2008) distinguishes Bayesians (i.e., users of Bayesian models in their appropriate context—what Savage 
described as Small Worlds—where all states and probabilities are known and genuine surprises therefore cannot occur)  
from “Bayesianismists” (i.e.,  those who mis-apply Bayesian models built for Small Worlds to Large-World domains, 
where Binmore and Savage would view it as preposterous to summarize one’s thinking by means of a single probability 
distribution or prior).  Gintis (forthcoming) allows that many important decisions may not have well-specified state 
spaces or well-defined probabilities, which he says calls for extensions of the Bayesian model to those challenging 
contexts, but with the Bayesian model serving as the singular benchmark model of information processing.  Gintis 
(forthcoming, p. 2) writes: “I have always been comfortable with identifying rationality with the Savage axioms, which 
may be described in shorthand as ‘preference consistency over lotteries with subjective probabilities.’”  And 
Loewenstein (2006) usefully cautions that theoretical extensions of standard models in pursuit of added realism, 
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Based on this near methodological consensus regarding the centrality of Bayes, we define 
consistency of beliefs as the extent to which subjective conditional beliefs adhere to Bayes’ Rule.  
Because Bayes’ Rule is equivalent to the definition of conditional probability, it imposes the following 
restriction on individuals’ subjective conditional beliefs (assuming that probabilities we supplied 
coincide with subjects’ unconditional beliefs): 
P(C|+)i P(+) = P(+|C)i P(C). 
The ratio of numerical values for the two unconditional probabilities in the expression above (if 
probabilistic logic is to be applied to subjective beliefs) requires that the ratio of elicited conditional 
beliefs takes on a specific numerical ratio: 
P(C|+)i /P(+|C)i = P(C)/P(+) = 0.025/0.050 = ½. 
One can then measure inconsistency in various ways based on deviations from this restriction.   
We define inconsistency as the absolute (log approximated) percentage deviation of an 
individual’s elicited ratio of conditional beliefs from the correct ratio of unconditional probabilities:4 
inconsistencyi = |log(  [ P(C|+)i / P(+|C)i ] / [1/2] )|. 
Of 125 respondents who provided a complete set of elicited belief data, 24 (19 percent) generated 
perfectly Bayesian conditional beliefs, indicated by inconsistencyi = 0.5   
Published point estimates for these conditional probabilities are P(C|+)
 
= 0.34 and P(+|C)
 
= 
0.68.  Note that one’s beliefs can be substantially inaccurate, even as a perfect Bayesian.  For example, 
six perfect Bayesians in our sample reported P(C|+)i = 0.50 and  P(+|C)i  = 1.00; two reported 0.20 and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
especially concerning information and information processing, do not necessarily wind up being more realistic. 
4
 The log-approximated percentage deviation from Bayes’ Rule has two main advantages over other measures of deviation.  
First, it attenuates and therefore reduces the influence of extreme deviations, which makes the results we report 
conservative.  Second, unlike exact percentage deviations, the log-approximation is completely symmetric, because log(  
[ P(C|+)i / P(+|C)i ] / [1/2] ) = -  log(  [ P(+|C)i / P(C|+)i ] / 2 ), and therefore does not depend on whether the restriction is 
expressed as P(C|+)i /P(+|C)i =  ½ or as P(+|C)i /P(C|+)i =  2. 
5
 Our survey team intercepted ASSA attendees just outside the hall where the main registration desk was, using  a scripted 
3- to 10-minute face-to-face interview protocol.  ASSA attendees were surprisingly agreeable to provide us with 
subjective beliefs about prostate cancer risks and self-reports about PSA testing.  We collected 133 surveys.  Eight 
respondents supplied partial belief data by non-responding to at least one of the five belief items, leaving 125 complete 
observations.  The eight partial responders are excluded from the analysis except where noted otherwise. 
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0.40; and one reported 0.10 and 0.20, all of which are well into the upper half of the inaccuracy 
distribution, despite adhering perfectly to Bayes’ Rule.  There is a problem, however, using the same 
pair of elicited beliefs to compute both inconsistency and inaccuracy, because those measures are then 
functionally and statistically dependent.  Instead, we use a different, but related, set of survey items to 
measure accuracy: two subjective beliefs about lifetime (as opposed to point-in-time) risk of prostate 
cancer, and lifetime probability of mortality from prostate cancer.  These beliefs measures of lifetime 
incidence and mortality depend on roughly the same factual sources, but are numerically very different 
because the majority of prostate cancers are slow-growing and non-lethal. Computing inconsistency 
based on the conditional beliefs described earlier and inaccuracy based on lifetime incidence and 
mortality, we can inspect bivariate covariation in these two variables in the scatter plot shown in Figure 
2, with inconsistency on the x-axis versus inaccuracy on the y-axis. 
The 24 observations clustered along the y-axis are perfect Bayesians with zero inconsistency.  
Notice that the two most inaccurate observations are perfect Bayesians.  In the other direction, the two 
most inconsistent observations are well below the midpoint of the inaccuracy range.  The distribution 
consists of a relatively small number of extreme responses which are highly inconsistent and/or 
inaccurate, and a larger group that is minimally to moderately inconsistent and inaccurate. Overall 
pairwise correlation is −0.04 and statistically insignificant.  Translated into elasticity of inaccuracy 
with respect to inconsistency, the coefficient from a bivariate regression of accuracy on inconsistency 
is −0.06 (i.e., elasticity, since both variables are in log units) with t statistic −0.46.  Eliminating extreme 
observations in all combinations that we tried (e.g., throwing away the five largest observations of 
inconsistency and inaccuracy, or the 10 extremes of both) raises the magnitude of the negative 
correlation, often dramatically so.  For example, if we throw away observations with inconsistency 
greater than 1.5, pairwise correlation becomes −0.30 with elasticity −0.60 (t statistic = −3.5).  That 
would imply (by linear extrapolation) that beliefs twice as inconsistent as average are expected to be 60 
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percent more accurate. There is no evidence for positive association between consistency and accuracy.  
We speculate that many of us who teach choice under uncertainty might expect (or wish) that 
different normative metrics (i.e., consistency and accuracy of beliefs) would correlate positively, 
implying convergence or harmonization among potentially contradictory normative criteria.  Suppose, 
for example, people with fewer transitivity violations (another normative metric based solely on 
internal consistency) also turned out to be more Bayesian, with more accurate beliefs, higher levels of 
accumulated wealth, substantially longer lives, superior health, and higher than average levels of self-
reported happiness.  Then axiomatic rationality based solely on internal consistency might be regarded 
as standing on a firm evidential basis, bolstering these axioms’ intuitive appeal by correlating 
positively with normative measures that do not depend on internal consistency.6  Any positive 
association between consistency and accuracy of beliefs remains, as yet, empirically unsubstantiated as 
far as we are aware, and is refuted by our data. 
As the quotations appearing before the introduction of this article suggest, many of us—when it 
really matters (e.g., giving advice to a loved one, or a high-stakes medical decision)—apply normative 
criteria that go beyond, and sometimes contradict, internal consistency.7  The first issue this paper 
                                                 
6
 The psychologists Hastie and Rasinski (1986) were the first to classify the two distinct categories of normative measures 
that Gilboa (forthcoming) also discusses (unfortunately, using the same term “coherence” in a manner diametrically 
opposed to Hastie and Rasinski’s usage).  Hastie and Rasinski (1986) and Hammond (1996) refer to norms based on 
internal consistency as coherence norms (e.g., Bayesian beliefs, transitivity, Kolmogorov axioms) to distinguish them 
from non-consistency-based normative metrics based instead on free-standing scales measuring a level of performance, 
referred to as correspondence norms.  Correspondence norms are so named because they measure how well an 
individual’s choices or inferences correspond to the demands of his or her environment.  The key difference is that 
correspondence norms (i.e., free-standing level-of-performance norms, which include accuracy of beliefs, accumulated 
wealth, lifespan, and happiness) can rank the single acts of two people, whereas consistency or coherence norms say 
nothing about single acts when considered in isolation and only impose restrictions on pairs or larger sets of decisions. 
Gilboa (forthcoming) poses the question of whether non-consistency-based normative measures such as happiness 
belong in definitions of economic rationality at all.  He makes a strong case for explicitly defining rationality, perhaps 
pluralistically and with context dependence to bring in criteria other than consistency.   
7
 According to an anecdote from reliable sources concerning a well-known proponent of axiomatic decision theory, when 
faced with the decision of whether to take a job offer from a competing university, the proponent deliberately chose to 
deviate from the normative theory which he knew well.  It was not due to indifference.  It was a high stakes decision, 
and he therefore brought in normative criteria other than consistency to assess what it would mean to make a good 
decision.  When colleagues asked him why he didn’t just choose a prior, add up probability-weighted utilities associated 
with each of his options, and choose according to the criterion of maximum expected utility, the decision theorist replied 
in exasperation: “Come on, this is serious!” (Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 62).   This anecdote illustrates that even those who 
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seeks to address is how to document empirical regularities linking consistency to the objective 
accuracy of subjective beliefs.  The elicitation technique reported here provides a tool that allows for 
virtually any functional relationship between consistency and accuracy (measured at the individual 
level), enabling us to pose the following question as a hypothesis test: “Do people with consistent 
beliefs also tend to have accurate beliefs?” 
The second question concerns whether inconsistency is associated with economic losses.  
Google Scholar returns more than 4,000 hits associated with the phrase “non-Bayesian beliefs.”  
EconLit returns more than 3,800 hits.  Judging from this intense scrutiny by economic researchers, one 
might presume that deviations from Bayes’ Rule have important economic consequences.  And they 
might.  Yet one finds little evidence to substantiate the hypothesis of economic losses due to 
inconsistent beliefs in this same literature.8  Raising questions about whether deviations from standard 
normative benchmarks are individually or socially costly (or perhaps even beneficial) should not imply 
broader skepticism about the substantial experimental evidence documenting anomalies and biases.  On 
the contrary, when one takes the behavioral economics literature seriously, especially its priority on 
empirical realism, it suggests a much needed follow-up question: If individuals do not conform to 
standard normative decision-making models, what then is the economic cost? 
In search of evidence for direct costs due to inconsistency, we adopt a model which assumes 
that PSA decisions are based on minimization of a loss function that depends on beliefs about prostate 
cancer risks, beliefs about the quality of the screening instrument, and the PSA decision itself.  We 
follow Gaechter, Orzen, Renner, and Starmer (2009) in attempting to take advantage of the high level 
                                                                                                                                                                       
best understand the mechanics of Bayesian reasoning find it inapplicable as a tool, or procedure, for making decisions. 
8
 Behavioral economists have paid close attention to modeling deviations from Bayes’ Rule, and experimental economists 
have spent considerable effort documenting the degree to which subjects conform to or deviate from Bayes’ Rule (e.g., 
Camerer 1987, 1992; Ganguly, Kagel and Moser, 2000; Kluger and Wyatt, 2003).  The unstated presumption in much of 
this literature is that people ought to be Bayesian, a point of view that Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2009, p. 286) 
explicitly challenge, with the observation that an arbitrarily chosen prior in conflict with frequency data would seem 
hardly rational: “A paradigm of rational belief should allow a distinction between assessments that are well-founded and 
those that are arbitrary.” 
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of statistical fluency and familiarity with axioms of rational choice among economists by studying data 
collected from them.  Minimization of expected losses leads to an objective function that can, in theory, 
be influenced by inconsistent beliefs through two distinct channels.  The first channel through which 
losses could occur would be if inconsistency causes inaccurate beliefs, in which case we would expect 
to find a strong positive association between inconsistency and inaccuracy.  The second channel for 
inconsistency to cause losses would be if inconsistent people had a different likelihood of having a 
PSA test (net of the effect of inconsistency on subjective beliefs about risks and benefits).  In this case, 
we would expect to estimate a large effect of inconsistency on the PSA decision itself (either positive 
or negative, since we make no assumption about whether PSA testing is good or bad) in the presence of 
controls measuring subjective beliefs about cancer risks, benefits and costs of PSA testing.  The 
intuition is simple: if inconsistent beliefs are costly, then one expects that inconsistent men either have 
less accurate beliefs, or a systematically different behavioral mapping from perceived costs and 
benefits into PSA decisions.   
The third issue addressed in this paper concerns the actual decision process men use to make 
decisions about getting tested for PSA.  Subjective beliefs about cancer risks, the quality of the PSA 
test, and chances of negative side effects (conditional on surgical or radiation treatment) surprisingly 
have no predictive power for self-reported PSA decisions.  This corroborates what respondents self-
reported about their decision-making processes: low rates of search for statistical information and low 
rates of “weighing pros and cons” even among respondents who identified both benefits and harms. We 
find that respondents condition PSA testing decisions on social cues (variables coding whom one 
talked to prior to deciding to get tested).  Given strong incentives for doctors to practice defensive 
medicine, over-test, and over-diagnose (Studdert et al., 2005), it is surprising that economists, who are 
well aware of incentive-mismatch problems, appear to ignore advice from the National Cancer Institute 
to weigh pros and cons before testing. 
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Because there is room for misunderstanding, we want to state explicitly that our goal was not to 
demonstrate that economists fail to conform to Bayes’ Rule.  As mentioned, 24 out of 125 conformed 
perfectly to Bayes’ Rule.  We want to stress that, in the absence of evidence showing that deviations 
from Bayes’ Rule adversely affect payoffs, we do not interpret these deviations as irrationality.  Rather, 
our goal is to provide an empirically grounded account of the actual decision process that statistically 
sophisticated decision makers use, revealing what––if any––role internal consistency of beliefs plays.    
Section 2 describes how the data were collected and reports descriptive statistics.  Section 3 
presents the main findings in the form of regressions linking consistency to accuracy and, second, 
consistency to self-reported PSA decisions.  Section 4 investigates the robustness of these findings, 
presenting further evidence regarding the role of social influences in PSA testing decisions.  Finally, 
Section 5 discusses interpretations of the results and prospects for new norms of rationality that allow 
for inconsistency. 
Section 2: Description of data 
Descriptive Data About Survey Respondents 
We surveyed attendees of the annual meeting of the American Economic Association (regularly 
attended by approximately 9,000 registered conference participants), also known as the Allied Social 
Science Associations meetings, January 6-8, 2006, in Boston, Massachusetts. Our interviewer 
conducted face-to-face interviews based on a scripted protocol designed to last three to 10 minutes, 
although no time limit was imposed.  The script (reproduced verbatim in Appendix 1) was visible to 
respondents, and the interviewer encouraged respondents to read any sample items for themselves if 
they wanted clarification.  Most interviews were collected a few meters from the registration desk at 
the AEA meetings, which also served as a passageway to and from conference sessions.  The location 
was chosen to ensure, as much as possible, representative chances of intercepting different types of 
conference attendees.   
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The interviewer approached men only, and only those who appeared to be at least 40 years old.  
He approached potential survey respondents with a memorized introductory statement offering 
respondents a choice of $3 cash or a Swiss chocolate bar, and assurances that the survey would be 
short.  Survey respondents who chose $3 instead of the chocolate bar (83 versus 17 percent) were asked 
if they wanted to donate the $3 participation fee to a cancer charity, which a majority did.  Table 1 
contains summary statistics for survey responses. 
Of 133 respondents, 123 (92 percent) said they were economists.  The 10 non-economists 
described themselves as political scientists or academics working in fields that overlap with economics.  
A few additional survey items not summarized in Table 1 were collected as well.  For example, 
respondents’ subfields revealed a nicely heterogeneous representation of the economics profession, and 
these subfield indicators are used as controls in some of the regressions reported in the next section.  
The age distribution was remarkably symmetric, with a mean of 51, and covering a large range, 26 to 
79.  For the most part, our interviewer succeeded at hitting the over-40 target, with 119 reporting ages 
of 40 or older. 
Nearly half the respondents (46 percent) reported having had a PSA.  Among respondents 50 
and older, the rate of PSA testing was 65 percent.  Most respondents (91 percent of the 124 who 
responded) said they recommend that men in their 50s have a PSA, with almost no difference in rates 
of recommendation by age.   
Non-Response 
In Table 1, the column under the heading(s) “Number of Responses” shows that item-specific 
non-response was a problem for several questions, although not the ones we would have expected.  
Nine refused to classify their work as either “more applied” or “more theoretical.”  No one refused to 
say whether he had taken a PSA.  Nine refused, however, to make a recommendation about whether 
men in their 50s should have a PSA.   
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Perceived Harms, Risks and Benefits of PSA Testing 
We will return to the remaining items in Table 1 shortly.  Before getting to those, Table 2 
summarizes eight frequently cited medical studies about the risks and benefits of PSA testing, with 
comments highlighting statistical findings and expert opinion, especially potential harms from 
screening, which patients undertaking cost-benefit calculations would likely want to consider.  After 
gaining FDA approval in 1986 for use among men already diagnosed with prostate cancer, PSA testing 
spread rapidly as a screening tool for asymptomatic men, with some estimating that by the late 1990s 
as many as half of American men over the age of 50 had undergone PSA testing (Gann, 1997).  Aside 
from the large direct costs of financing mass screening, which have been estimated at $12 to 18 billion 
per year (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2002, p. 128), another key point of contention regarding 
PSA screening concerns the benefit of early detection.  Most prostate cancers grow so slowly that 
patients with prostate cancer die of other causes first (Stanford et al., 1999; U.S. Preventive Services 
Task Force, 2002).  The benefits of early detection may also be limited in the case of fast-growing 
cancers for which treatment has very limited success.  While some studies report evidence that early 
detection of prostate cancer reduces disease-specific mortality, there is no evidence showing reduction 
in overall mortality (Ciatto et al., 2000; Holmberg, et al., 2002; Yao and Lu-Yao, 2002; Draisma et al., 
2003; Concato et al., 2006).  The most recent randomized trial in the U.S. found no evidence that PSA 
screening reduces death from prostate cancer or death from cancer in general; in fact the death rates 
were slightly higher in the screening group (Andriole et al., 2009). At the same time, the medical 
literature reports significant harms from prostate cancer screening, including psychological stress, 
needless biopsies following false positives, and overtreatment of nonlethal prostate cancers that result 
in complications such as incontinence and impotence (Wang and Arnold, 2002; Hawkes, 2006).   
Returning to Table 1, the survey item labeled “Harms?” encodes responses to the forced-choice 
(yes/no) question: “In your opinion are there potential harms associated with PSA screening?”  In light 
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of the medical literature summarized in Table 2, it surprised us that only a quarter of respondents said 
there were harms associated with PSA testing.  Perhaps most surprising was that only about a third of 
respondents reported weighing pros and cons when deciding whether to have a PSA test.  Not weighing 
pros and cons can, of course, be rationalized if someone perceives zero costs or zero benefits, because 
in that case there are no tradeoffs to weigh.  When it comes to PSA testing, however, the material in 
Table 2 shows a medical literature that has, from the mid-1990s, emphatically recommended weighing 
costs and benefits as opposed to automatic screening for asymptomatic patients.  We worried, in fact, 
that this sample item asking whether economists had weighed the pros and cons might not generate any 
variation, with nearly all respondents answering “Yes.”   
Elicited Frequencies 
The following five probabilistic beliefs were elicited: 
• lifetime incidence (the probability that a randomly drawn male in the U.S. is diagnosed with 
prostate cancer within his lifetime ) denoted P(C Lifetime) 
• lifetime mortality (the probability that a randomly drawn male in the U.S. dies of prostate cancer 
within his lifetime) denoted P(D Lifetime) 
• incontinence probability (the probability of incontinence conditional on surgical treatment for 
prostate cancer) denoted P(Incontinence | Surgery) 
• posterior probability (the probability that an asymptomatic U.S. male in his 50s has prostate 
cancer conditional on a positive PSA test) denoted P(C|+) 
• sensitivity (the probability that an asymptomatic U.S. male in his 50s has a positive PSA test 
conditional on the event that he has prostate cancer at the time of screening) denoted P(+|C). 
The bottom block of elicited belief and published point estimates in Table 1 shows that 
respondents’ beliefs about these probabilities tended to be slightly too large, but not far off from 
published point estimates in the medical literature.  Insofar as cost-benefit considerations drive PSA 
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decisions, one would expect these five belief variables to have joint explanatory power as a proxy for 
perceived net benefits of testing.  We test that hypothesis below. 
Consistency and Accuracy of Beliefs 
We sought to construct a measure of logical inconsistency that does not depend directly on the 
accuracy of stated beliefs, so that functionally independent measures of consistency and accuracy, 
based on separate sets of survey items, could be computed for each individual.  To accomplish this, the 
elicitation scheme (as described in the Introduction) allowed for infinitely many pairs of subjective 
beliefs to be perfectly Bayesian, regardless of accuracy. Our interview script reads: 
The main focus of the survey is prostate cancer and PSA (Prostate Specific Antigen) screening. I 
won’t ask any personal questions about the illness itself, just about screening.  I’d like to elicit 
your best guesses about the risks of prostate cancer.   
[Elicitation of P(C Lifetime)i:] For a randomly drawn American male, I’d like you to guess the 
probability that he will be diagnosed with prostate cancer in his lifetime? 
[Elicitation of P(D Lifetime)i:] What would you say is the probability that he will die from 
prostate cancer in his lifetime? 
Now I’m going to ask you about American males in their 50s who have no symptoms, have 
never been diagnosed with prostate cancer, and are screened with a PSA test for the very first 
time.   One leading study suggests that 5% of randomly sampled men from this population have a 
positive PSA.  It’s also estimated that 2.5% actually have prostate cancer at the time of 
screening, which includes those whose PSAs failed to detect the disease.  [source: Harris and 
Lohr, 2002, Ann Intern Med]. 
[Elicitation of P(C|+)i:] Given a positive PSA, I’d like you to estimate the probability that a man 
actually has prostate cancer.   
[Elicitation of P(+|C)i:] And given cancer at the time of screening, what would you say is the 
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probability of a positive PSA?   
The first two elicited beliefs, lifetime incidence and mortality, are used to construct a measure 
of belief inaccuracy. The conditional point-in-time beliefs are used to construct a measure of belief 
inconsistency.  As is clear from the interview script, applying the definition of conditional probability 
to these conditional beliefs imposes the restriction: P(C|+)i/P(+|C)i=1/2.  Respondents might know 
nothing about relevant medical studies and published PSA facts but nevertheless conform perfectly to 
this restriction and be perfectly Bayesian.  Absolute log-approximated percentage deviations from this 
Bayesian restriction generates our measure of an individual’s inconsistency:9  
inconsistencyi  = |  log[P(C|+)i/P(+|C)i] – log[1/2]  |. 
 Inaccuracy of beliefs with respect to published point estimates is defined as:  
inaccuracyi = ( | log[P(C Lifetime)i/0.177)] | + | log[P(D Lifetime)i/0.028] | )/2. 
This definition computes inaccuracy by averaging absolute percentage deviations of lifetime incidence 
and lifetime mortality from their respective point estimates in the medical literature.10  The scatter plot 
of inconsistency and inaccuracy presented earlier revealed zero or negative correlation.  If one supposes 
there is a single scale of general intelligence, or a single-dimensional spectrum of axiomatic rationality, 
as is commonly implied by references to “rational” versus “irrational” subjects in the behavioral 
                                                 
9
  We re-ran regressions reported in the next section with alternative definitions of inconsistency based on other functional 
specifications of the deviation.  For example, deviation can be measured in percentage points as opposed to percentage 
deviations with the following formula (although it gives disproportionate influence to respondents with large-magnitude 
beliefs): absolute percentage-point deviation from Bayes = | P(+|C)i - 2P(C|+)i |.  Another deviation measure we tried 
was raw percentage deviations rather than log approximations: absolute percentage deviation from Bayes = | 
[P(C|+)i/P(+|C)i  - 1/2]/(1/2) |, which produces a much more spread out distribution and, unfortunately, is not invariant 
under algebraically equivalent re-statements of the restriction.  For example, a slightly different deviation emerges from 
the formula: alternative absolute percentage deviation from Bayes = | [P(+|C)i/P(C|+)i - 2]/2 |.  The log approximations 
we use attenuate extreme deviators and produce more conservative (i.e., smaller magnitude) correlations.  We also tried 
binary classification schemes splitting the sample into subsamples of consistent Bayesians versus inconsistent non-
Bayesians.  Dichotomization as shown in the next table actually strengthens the case for our interpretations. 
10
  Lifetime incidence and lifetime mortality are used because the point-in-time PSA-related frequencies (posterior 
probability and sensitivity) were already used to compute inconsistency. Most of the variation in inaccuracy as defined 
above derives from beliefs about mortality since it is much rarer and therefore generates a wider range of percentage 
deviations.  We re-ran all empirical models using alternative measures of inconsistency: lifetime incidence deviations 
alone, lifetime mortality devaitions alone, and an average of five deviations based on all five elicited beliefs, revealing 
no substantive changes.  Appendices 2 and 3 describe the distributions of these measures in greater detail. 
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economics literature, one would expect performance according to one normative metric to correlate 
positively with performance as measured by other normative metrics.  These data provide no support 
for such a theory.  
Accuracy and Consistency Within Subsamples 
Next, four cuts of the sample are used to divide respondents into consistent and inconsistent 
subsamples and contrasts in mean inaccuracy are reported.  Groupings into consistent versus 
inconsistent subsamples are shown as columns in Table 3: perfect Bayesians versus deviators from 
Bayes; below- versus above-median inconsistency; bottom versus upper quartiles of inconsistency; and 
Ballpark Bayesians (a very inclusive classification for anyone whose inconsistencies can be modeled as 
Bayesian beliefs plus a noise term) versus Emersonians (those who commit gross errors in conditional 
probabilistic reasoning described in detail below).11  The first column contains mean values of 
inaccuracy, signed inaccuracy, four log deviations of elicited beliefs, inconsistency and signed 
inconsistency.  Reading horizontally across the first row, Table 3 indicates the average among the 24 
perfect Bayesians (those with inconsistencyi=0) had higher inaccuracy than the rest of the sample (1.26 
versus 0.90).  Similarly, the lower half of the inconsistency distribution had higher inaccuracy than the 
upper half (1.08 versus 0.87), and the lower quartile had higher inaccuracy than the upper quartile (1.26 
versus 0.77).  According to the fourth cut of the sample into Ballpark Bayesians and Emersonians, 
accuracy is, once again, negatively associated with consistency (inaccuracy of 1.08 among the 
consistent versus 0.78 among the inconsistent).   
The second row of Table 3 shows that beliefs of consistent respondents tend to be too small, 
whereas the beliefs of inconsistent individuals tend to overshoot the estimates in medical journals.  
Consistent individuals’ beliefs are not, however, generally any closer to those published estimates.  
                                                 
11
 The label is inspired by Emerson’s (1841) “Self Reliance” in which he wrote: “The other terror that scares us from self-
trust is our consistency … A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and 
philosophers and divines. With consistency, a great soul has simply nothing to do.” 
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Rows 3 and 4 show log deviations for lifetime incidence and mortality, the two components averaged 
in signed inaccuracy and inaccuracy.   
Of the 16 t statistics in the middle block of Table 3 labeled under the heading “log deviations,” 
five have magnitude greater than 2, indicating statistically significant unconditional differences in 
means between consistent and inconsistent subsamples.  Of these five significant differences, 
consistent individuals’ mean deviation from zero is smaller in three cases12 and larger in two.13  These 
disaggregated bivariate contrasts, while mixed, do not show any tendency for consistent individuals to 
have more accurate beliefs, and are generally consistent with the initial view of the bivariate 
relationship in Figure 2. 
Taxonomy of Inconsistencies: Emersonians and Ballpark Bayesians 
Closer examination of the elicitation scheme reveals that there are conceptually distinct ways in 
which a respondent can deviate from Bayes’ Rule.  Some respondents are within plausible bounds 
(defined just below) and could be modeled as if they were producing Bayesian beliefs with an error 
term that produces moderately inconsistent conditional beliefs.  Other subjects’ beliefs involve more 
basic violations of inequalities required by conditional probability.  The former group is referred to as 
Ballpark Bayesians and the gross violators of the definition of conditional probability are referred to as 
Emersonians.  
We define three types of gross violations of probability theory, any one of which would indicate 
a process for generating beliefs that cannot possibly be reconciled with the definition of conditional 
probability. The first gross logical error is P(C|+)i > 0.50.  The definition of conditional probability 
                                                 
12
  The three cases in Table 2 where consistent individuals are, on average, closer to zero deviation than inconsistent 
individuals are: -0.00 versus 0.22 for log(posterior/0.34) among perfect Bayesians and deviators from Bayes, with t 
statistic  -2.1; -0.18 versus 0.48 for log(mortality/0.028) among Ballpark Bayesians and Emersonians, with t statistic -
2.5; and -0.11 versus 0.67 for log(posterior/0.34) among Ballpark Bayesians and Emersonians, with t statistic -7.9. 
13
  The two cases in Table 2 where consistent individuals are, on average, farther away from zero deviation are: -0.69 
versus 0.23 for log(mortality/0.028) among perfect Bayesians and deviators from Bayes, with t statistic -2.2; and 0.13 
versus -0.10 for log(sensitivity/0.64) among lower and upper quartiles of the inconsistency distribution, with t statistic of 
2.5. 
 16 
states that P(C|+)  = P(C ∩ +)/P(+).  The numerator refers to an intersection of events for which it must 
be true that P(C ∩ +) ≤ min{P(C), P(+)}=0.025.  The unconditional probabilities provided to 
respondents imply that conditional beliefs must be bounded above by ½: 
P(C|+)i ≤ 0.025/0.05 = 0.50 
Elicited probabilities precisely at the upper bound of 0.50 correspond to the belief that there are no 
false positives.  Of 133 respondents, 36 (34 economists and 2 non-economists) violated this logical 
bound with subjective posterior beliefs strictly greater than 0.50.  
The second gross departure from probabilistic logic is P(C|+)i > P(+|C)i.  Substituting the 
definition of conditional probability for both terms, the numerators of the conditional probabilities are 
of course the same while the denominators take on known values.  But P(C)=0.025 < P(+PSA)=0.05 
implies P(C|+) ≤ P(+|C), which holds with equality only when the intersection event in the numerator 
has probability zero.  Eleven respondents strictly violated this condition, 9 of whom also committed the 
first gross departure. 
The third logical error is P(C|+)i = P(+|C)i.  Given the information provided which explicitly 
mentions false positives and cancers undetected by PSA testing, P(C|+PSA) cannot be zero.  The 
argument in the preceding paragraph implies the sharp restriction P(C|+) < P(+|C).  Sixteen respondents 
provided equal conditional beliefs.  Of these, seven also violated the first logical restriction by stating 
P(C|+)i = P(+|C)i>0.50.  Seven others stated P(C|+)i = P(+PSA|C)i=0.50.  In total, 45 respondents 
committed at least one of the three errors resulting in the designation Emersonian.   
Section 3: Evidence that Inconsistency Leads to Economic Losses? 
Loss Function With Two Channels For Inconsistency  
Denote respondent i's inconsistency as δi.  His probabilistic beliefs, which are a function of 
inconsistency, are represented as bi(δi). Person-specific value judgments needed to rank contingent 
outcomes associated with prostate cancer, PSA testing, and treatment options, are summarized by the 
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parameter vector θi, which is interpreted as accounting for all inter-personal differences aside from 
inconsistency and beliefs.  We suppose that ω represents states of nature drawn from a standard 
probability measure on the universe Ω.  In the PSA testing context, states can be thought of as terminal 
nodes on a large probabilistic event tree generating contingencies that describe various combinations of 
events: cancer, positive PSA, types of prostate cancer, and treatment options in the event of cancer.   
States ω include contingencies with successful treatments, partially successful treatments with 
side-effects, and contingencies with unnecessary surgeries (i.e., surgery that removes slow-growing 
cancers which would not have proved lethal if left untreated)—as well as the opposite, contingencies in 
which valuable treatment options are missed.  The first step from the root of the event tree has two 
branches corresponding to the unobserved events of prostate cancer and no prostate cancer.  The 
second step has four branches total, two branches from the cancer node, and two from the no cancer 
node, corresponding to the observed events +PSA and -PSA.   
The path along the tree corresponding to the joint event “No cancer and -PSA” is a terminal 
node.  We can normalize the payoff associated with this node to zero, indicating a status-quo outcome 
that abstracts from small monetary, time and hassle costs associated with having the PSA test and 
receiving a correct, negative result.  Along the branch with no cancer and +PSA (i.e., a false positive), 
several contingencies are possible corresponding to various options given to patients who have a 
positive PSA.  These include watchful waiting (with the stress of worrying about as-yet undiagnosed 
prostate cancer); biopsy, false positive on biopsy, unnecessary surgery; biopsy, false negative on 
biopsy, undiagnosed cancer; biopsy, correct positive indicating cancer; or a biopsy that successfully 
rules out prostate cancer.   
From this long yet far-from-complete list of states ω, one appreciates that many person-specific 
value judgments must go into assigning payoffs so that all contingencies can be ranked.  For example, 
as authors of one of the medical journals quoted in Table 2 wrote, some men will prefer to live fewer 
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years with a fully functioning body, and others will prefer to live more years with side effects of 
treatment.  Still others might prefer to never be tested or diagnosed, regardless of the underlying 
physical state.  The person-specific parameters in θi imply that loss functions for different people will 
take on different values (representing different rankings of states) even if their subjective beliefs are 
identical: even if bi = bi’ and δi = δi’ , then i and i' will nevertheless assign different losses to each 
contingency ω, and possibly make different ex ante loss-minimizing testing decisions ti* ≠ ti’*, 
whenever θi ≠ θi'.  This allows for full heterogeneity in ranking the contingent outcomes and does not 
presume there is a universally correct decision (to test, or not to test).   
Given these definitions, the very standard probabilistic structure generating ω conditional on 
subjective beliefs bi is summarized by a conditional pdf: fω|b(ω, bi(δi)). The loss function depends on 
states, inconsistency (which imparts a direct effect on the losses assigned to all contingencies net of its 
effect on beliefs about the probabilities of reaching any particular node on the tree), the testing decision 
denoted ti, and  person-specific parameters needed to rank contingencies: L(ω, δi, ti; θi). Taking beliefs 
and inconsistency as fixed, the decision maker computes risk (i.e., expected loss) at each element in the 
binary choice set (either ti = 0 which codes the decision not to have a PSA test, or ti =1, which codes 
the decision to have a PSA): 
R0 = ∫Ω L(ω, δi ,0 ;θi) fω|b(ω, bi(δi)) dω, 
R1 = ∫Ω L(ω, δi ,1 ;θi) fω|b(ω, bi(δi)) dω. 
Finally, the optimal choice of ti minimizes risk: ti* = argmint in {0, 1}Rt. 
One sees from this that there are two channels through which δi exerts an influence on PSA 
decisions ti* and therefore two channels through which one might observe evidence, albeit indirectly, 
that δi is associated with economically meaningful losses.  The empirical strategy is to examine the 
channels separately (after linearizing the functional dependence of bi on δi and of ti* on δi). We seek to 
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measure the effect of δi on bi and the effect of δi on ti*.  If inconsistency leads to losses, then we expect 
to observe empirical effects of appreciable size through at least one of these two channels. 
Chanel 1: Empirical Model With Conditional Effect of Inconsistency on Inaccuracy 
Table 4 shows results from a regression of inaccuracy on inconsistency, with controls for 
whether respondents consulted written information, the mode in which information was processed, 
social influencers, a quadratic function of age, and subfield indicators along with other personal 
characteristics from the survey.  Comparing the simple bivariate model (in which the regression 
coefficient on inconsistency was -.06) to the kitchen sink model in Table 4 (in which the coefficient on 
inconsistency is nearly the same, changing only to -.08), one sees no evidence that inconsistency exerts 
large conditional effects on the accuracy of beliefs.  Similarly for every intermediate specification 
involving different subsets of the regressors: we never saw a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient that would demonstrate a positive association between consistency and accuracy of beliefs. 
There are several puzzling effects in Table 4 to note, however.  Consulting written information 
paradoxically increases inaccuracy of beliefs.  On the other hand, deliberation captured by the variable 
“weighing pros and cons” appears to have a beneficial effect reducing inaccuracy, with a magnitude 
just large enough to cancel out the effect of consulting written information.  Although 29 respondents 
report consulting written information and 46 report weighing pros and cons, only 15 do both.  Six 
respondents report having consulted an authoritative source such as a medical journal, which also 
implies having consulted a written source.  The average neoclassical economist and average 
econometrician were about one third less inaccurate than the sample average.   
Chanel 2: Empirical Models With Conditional Effects of Inconsistency on PSA Testing 
Table 5 presents estimates of four linear probability models, with t statistics computed using 
robust standard errors.14  The first three models are the main focus—prediction of PSA decisions. The 
                                                 
14
  Logit and probit models produce qualitatively identical results and are available from the authors upon request.  Similar 
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fundamental model assumes PSA decisions are a function of all five subjective beliefs and a quadratic 
function of age.  The add-info-processing model assumes that PSA decisions are a function of 
everything appearing in the fundamental model and, in addition, depend on information acquisition, 
information processing, and inconsistency.  Finally, the add influencers model allows the probability of 
taking a PSA to encompass the two previous models and, in addition, depend on social influencers.  
The final columns of Table 5 provide a comparison of the same encompassing model applied to a 
different dependent variable, respondents’ PSA recommendations. 
We find statistical confirmation of the self-reports that most economists do not weigh costs and 
benefits in the results of a joint test that the first five regressors have zero coefficients.  This 
corresponds to the hypothesis that subjective beliefs about cancer risks and benefits of treatment do not 
influence PSA decisions.  The second-to-last row of Table 5 shows p-values for that hypothesis, which 
reveal surprisingly weak predictive power of subjective beliefs in the first two models.  This weak 
predictive power does not result from overall weakness of the prediction equation, however, as 
likelihood ratio tests easily reject the hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero, across all 
models.  According to the p-value in the third model, however, subjective costs and benefits begin to 
have statistically significant predictive power once information about social influences is added to the 
model.  Even in the add influencers model, individual beliefs have surprisingly weak effects on the 
probability of having PSA testing.  For example, the perceived risk of incontinence, which we would 
have guessed would strongly condition men’s evaluations of the test’s desirability, has very moderate 
effects across the three PSA-decision models, implying that a man whose perceived risk of 
incontinence to be twice as big as average is, at most, 6 to 8 percentage points less likely to have a 
PSA.  Coefficients on information acquisition and processing (i.e., pros-cons deliberation and logical 
                                                                                                                                                                       
to Wisdom, Downs and Loewenstein’s (2010) approach, we use the linear probability model estimated by OLS (with 
robust standard errors) to provide easy-to-interpret magnitudes of estimated effects on binary outcomes (healthy versus 
unhealthy menu choices, in their case, and PSA decisions in ours).  The linear probability model has the advantage of 
easily correcting for heteroscedasticity of errors.  We checked that none of the important effect sizes or qualitative 
results change with logit or probit specifications of the empirical model. 
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inconsistency) are nowhere statistically significant.   
The doctor influenced variable reveals strong conditional correlation between reliance on a 
doctor’s recommendation and PSA test taking, despite the obvious incentive mismatch in doctor-
patient transactions that lead to well-documented problems of defensive medicine, over-diagnosis, 
over-prescription, over-treatment and other potential problems that economists should be well aware of 
(see Behrens, Güth, Kliemt and Levati, 2005; Loewenstein, 2005; and Sorum et al., 2004, for more on 
doctor-patient incentive mismatch).  
Statistical Predictors of the PSA Recommendation? 
The simple correlation between PSA recommendations and self-reported decisions is a 
surprisingly small 0.09 (and far from statistical significance).  The last columns of Table 5 show the 
estimated prediction model applied to PSA recommendations. To keep the sample the same, the PSA 
recommendation was modified to a forced-choice version that codes non-responses as zeros.  Even in 
this forced-choice version, the rate of recommendation remains nearly twice as large as the rate of PSA 
taking, 85 versus 46 percent.  Beliefs about costs and benefits have more predictive power for PSA 
recommendations than for PSA decisions but, once again, consistency of beliefs plays a very limited 
role. 
Theories Regarding Inconsistent Beliefs and Other Forms of Inconsistency 
 Why might smart people hold inconsistent subjective beliefs? Gilboa, Postlewaite, and 
Schmeidler (2008) provide examples of decision contexts (e.g., wars, or a coin that one has never seen 
or flipped before) in which they argue it would be irrational to hold probabilistic beliefs. Non-standard 
reasoning processes that generate behavior inconsistent with axioms of internal consistency can be 
defended and, in some contexts, shown to enjoy advantages over decision processes adhering strictly to 
consistency (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995; Samuelson, 2001; Aragones et al., 2005; Spiegel, 
Heifetza and Shannon, 2007; Robson and Samuelson, 2009).  Grunwald and Halpern (2004) identify 
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the problem of dilation—where updating newly arrived information can cause posterior distributions to 
become more spread out and therefore less precise—to argue that non-Bayesian updating which 
sometimes ignores information provides more precise predictions. This less-is-more result regarding 
the number of variables used in prediction tasks appears in a growing number of theoretical and 
empirical studies (e.g., Hogarth and Karelia, 2005, 2006; Baucells, Carrasco and Hogarth, 2008; Berg 
and Hoffrage, 2008; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2009).  The finding that less information can enhance 
performance also appears in laboratory studies (Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber, 1989) and financial 
data (DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal, 2009).   
In a related vein, models of time-inconsistency (Loewenstein, 1987) and the possibly adaptive 
advantages of time-inconsistency have been discussed (Halpern, 1997; Robson and Samuelson, 2009; 
Warneryd, forthcoming).  One empirical study showed that time-inconsistency and expected utility 
violations were both associated with higher payoffs, inside and outside the task domain that generated 
those inconsistencies (Berg, Eckel and Johnson, 2010).  Theoretical work on rule-based behavior 
typically considered to be incompatible with axiomatic rationality has stimulated discussions about 
inconsistencies that provide compensating benefits of simplicity and robustness in the face of Large-
World uncertainty (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Bewley, 2002; Segal and Sobel, 2007; Comte and 
Postlewaite, 2008; and see also Gintis, 2010, on Homo Ludens).   
Normative Status of Bayesian Reasoning, Money Pumps and Dutch Books 
The Savage axioms underlying expected utility theory are a prime example of consistency 
criteria whose normative status is widely accepted despite a lack of evidence demonstrating that 
deviators suffer significant losses.  Sugden (1991) argues (with great originality in the face of near 
methodological consensus pointing in the opposite direction) against the normative interpretation of 
expected utility theory.   Hammond’s (1998) model formalizes the argument made informally many 
times before advocating a strong normative interpretation for expected utility theory and the Bayesian 
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mechanism that supports it.  Starmer (2000, 2005, 2009) provides truly illuminating historical and 
methodological analysis of normative debates about Bayesian reasoning and expected utility theory.    
Similar to Bayesian consistency, preference consistency is assumed in virtually every model 
with utility functions and often defended as normatively appealing based on inconsistent agents’ 
theoretical vulnerability to money-pump or Dutch Books exploitation (Davidson, McKinsey and 
Suppes 1955, p. 146; Raiffa 1968, p. 78).15  Although the existence of transitivity violations is by now 
beyond doubt (Tversky, 1969; Grether and Plott, 1979; Loomes, Starmer and Sugden, 1989, 1991; 
Sippel, 1997; Harbaugh, Krause and Berry, 2001; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; List and Millimet, 2004), 
there seems to be little evidence that individuals who behave inconsistently in real economic 
environments suffer significant losses as a result.  Chu and Chu (1990) and Cherry, Crocker and 
Shogren (2003) report some instances of individuals who are money-pumped in the lab, showing that 
they quickly learn to avoid inconsistent choices that leave them vulnerable to exploitation.  List and 
Millimet (2004) show that subjects in the field vary significantly in terms of consistency of choice 
patterns, and that market experience reduces the probability of inconsistent patterns of choice—without 
showing, however, that inconsistency leads to reduced levels of economic performance.  Although 
experience or contact with market pricing mechanisms can reduce buy/sell disparities and facilitate 
efficient pricing, such experience does not necessarily make individual-level inconsistencies disappear 
(Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden, 2010) and sometimes is associated with new inconsistencies (Braga, 
Humphrey, and Starmer, 2009).  Camerer and Hogarth (1999) suggest that learning about the 
consequences of one’s inconsistency occurs relatively slowly, and Loewenstein (1999, 2005) argues 
that many high-stakes decisions, especially medical decisions, are one-shot—without repetition in the 
                                                 
15
  Exceptions include a growing number of papers, some previously mentioned, including the models of Rubinstein and 
Spiegler (2008), Laibson and Yariv, (2007), Cubitt and Sugden (2001), and DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman 
(1991), in which inconsistent individuals do not necessarily succumb to exploitative competitors.  Fehr and Tyran 
(2005) and Halitwanger and Waldmand (1985) emphasize the role of strategic complementarities in determining 
whether inconsistency among a few individuals influences aggregate measures of economic performance, while Sen 
(1993) argues against the normative appeal of internal consistency axioms in general. 
 24 
decision maker’s natural environment—raising questions about whether economists should assume that 
inconsistency is likely to be exploited in competition and therefore mitigated by experience. Rubinstein 
and Spiegler (2008) critique money pump arguments on the grounds that actually carrying out 
exploitative transactions requires face-to-face contact that very likely triggers an attitude of caution or 
suspicion among the potentially exploitable.  As Rubinstein and Spiegler (2008, p. 237) put it, “We 
tend to think strategically about the situation and suspect that there is a ‘catch,’ even if we cannot 
pinpoint it.”  
Section 4: Decision Making Process in PSA Testing 
As mentioned earlier, only 46 out of 128 respondents reported having weighed pros and cons 
when deciding on PSA testing.  Among those who did not weigh pros and cons were 16 who did not 
despite having reported that they perceive harms. This clear departure from thought processes typically 
assumed in economics motivates us to look for more evidence about the decision making process.   The 
importance of modeling thought processes rather than restricting analysis to outcomes or consequences 
motivates the admittedly speculative considerations that follow and attempts to cull additional 
information from our data (Tukey, 1977; Rubinstein and Osborne, 1988; Leland, 1994; Gigerenzer and 
Selten, 2001; Bardsley et al., 2010).  This section attempts to follow Rubinstein’s recommendation 
(Rubinstein,1991, 2001, 2003, 2006) to open the “black box” of decision processes in more detail. 
Decision processes other than cost/benefit calculus can perform well by various normative metrics and, 
as numerous evolutionary models have shown, can be rationalizable under mechanisms that generate 
selective pressure.16   
One of the most frequently encountered non-standard decision procedures in evolutionary 
                                                 
16
 Rubinstein argues that experiments yield most insight when examining assumptions and documenting regularities that 
provide an evidential basis for others to inductively generate new theories (rather than testing predictions of theory).  
Sugden (2008a, 2009), too, points to a role for reporting on empirical regularities that can be used as an evidential basis 
for others to inductively construct new theory.  Binmore et al. (2002) reflect on the importance of investigating more 
deeply into how people think about games.  Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2009, p. 285) advocate “a view of 
rationality that requires a compromise between internal coherence and justification….”   
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models is imitation and, more generally, conditioning action on social cues (see Boyd and Richerson, 
1985, or Gintis, forthcoming, and the references therein regarding imitation and adaptive success). One 
important source of justification in the social and family environments in which we make medical 
decisions is social cues.  This section attempts to provide additional insight into the role of deliberative 
reasoning, the search for information, and social cues. 
Table 6 presents a cross-tabulation of responses to the harms question, and the pros and cons 
question.  Non-responses are recorded, too, because they might contain information about decision 
processes.  To examine whether the joint distribution of harms and weighing pros and cons is any 
different among PSA takers, Table 6 indicates in brackets the number within each cell who are self-
reported PSA takers.  The joint distributions among PSA-takers and non-PSA-takers are remarkably 
similar.  The respondents in the diagonal elements of the bivariate distribution include 59 respondents 
who do not see harms, which provides a plausible rationalization for having not weighed pros and cons.  
Twelve respondents’ reports were entirely consistent with cost/benefit calculus. Respondents in the off-
diagonal positions are, however, more difficult to square with cost-benefit calculus, raising the question 
of how they are choosing to get tested, if not by a process of weighing pros and cons? 
Guess-50 Heuristic 
One possibility is that, with no incentive payments for accurate guesses or (more likely, we 
think) reflecting honestly on their ignorance about statistical facts of PSA and prostate cancer, 
respondents simply guess 50 (as a default belief based on the standard appeal to symmetry).  It costs 
very little effort if it is the default belief about binary outcomes in the absence of data.  We coded the 
number of times respondents guessed “50 percent” to see if completely uninformed priors, or use of a 
guess-50 heuristic, was correlated with consistency or accuracy.  Among the five elicited beliefs about 
probabilities, the maximum number of times anyone in the sample guessed 50 is twice.  Interestingly, 
those who guessed 50 twice had more accurate beliefs, with mean inaccuracy of 0.71 (sd 0.01) among 
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the 22 respondents who guessed 50 twice, versus 1.02 (sd 0.09) among those who never guessed 50.  
Of the 24 perfect Bayesians, two guessed 50 twice.  Emersonians and Ballpark Bayesians guessed 50 at 
roughly the same rate.  And inconsistency was uncorrelated with guessing 50.  Appendix 4 discusses a 
negative finding—no natural frequency effect—relating to evidence in the psychology literature that 
communicating probabilities in natural frequencies (e.g., “7 in 1000” instead of “0.7 percent”) can lead 
to dramatic improvements in Bayesian reasoning and significantly different medical decisions.  
Additional Evidence Regarding Social Influences on PSA Decisions  
The paired rows of Table 7 present mean contrasts between subsamples that correspond to 
different hypotheses about the role of particular variables in influencing PSA decisions.  The first pair 
of rows shows the main finding, which is a large difference in the rate of PSA taking between those 
who reported nobody influenced them and those who reported at least one influencer (36 versus 78 
percent).  No other variable has such a large bivariate association with PSA taking. The remaining pairs 
look for other variables and interactions that modulate the effect of social influence.  
The second pair of rows in Table 7 looks for an effect of weighing pros and cons among those 
who reported being influenced by at least one other (most likely, a spouse).  In this subsample of 
socially influenced respondents, rates of PSA testing show virtually no effect from weighing pros and 
cons.  The third pair of rows in Table 7 shows the difference in rates of PSA testing among those who 
weigh pros and cons and those who do not, revealing a modest 15 percentage point difference: 76 
versus 61 percent.  As with all bivariate contrasts, causality is of course unclear.  One explanation for 
higher rates of PSA testing among those who weighed pros and cons is that, after getting tested as a 
result of a social heuristic, these respondents then gathered information and weighed pros and cons as 
an after-the-fact rationalization. 
 The fourth pair of rows in Table 7 casts some doubt on what exactly those who report weighing 
pros and cons are weighing.  Among those who weigh pros and cons, there is only a slight difference in 
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rates of PSA testing between those who perceive harms and those who perceive no harms: 86 and 76 
percent, respectively.  Similarly, the sixth pair of contrasts shows that among those who perceive 
harms, those who weighed pros and cons and those who did not have similar rates of PSA testing, 
although the small number of observations makes these comparisons imprecise. 
After social influences, the second largest bivariate contrast was between those who consulted 
written sources and those who did not (the 3rd from the bottom pair in Table 7), with rates of PSA 
testing of 95 and 55 percent, respectively. While this could have occurred as the result of information 
search consistent and subsequent weighing of costs and benefits according to the standard model, we 
strongly doubt it.  Much of the research literature on PSA testing in recent years has reported proven 
harms and no proven benefits associated with screening asymptomatic populations.  We would have 
guessed that reading the medical literature would lead economists to greater skepticism about the 
benefits of PSA testing. For example, the sources in Table 2 caution that discovering more cancers and 
discovering them earlier does not imply saving lives.  Another interesting statistical issue in prostate 
cancer risk studies is that PSA testing was shown to reduce disease-specific mortality but not overall 
mortality.  If weighing pros and cons caused the PSA decision rather than the other way around, then 
the difference in rates of PSA taking within pros-and-cons weighers should be especially large between 
those who perceive harms and those who do not (which it is not).   
One reading of these data is that those who perceived harms felt a greater need to rationalize 
their decision to get tested by reporting that their testing decisions resulted from a systematic process of 
weighing pros and cons.  This is consistent with the fourth through last rows of Table 7.  The next-to-
last (seventh) pair in Table 7 is consistent with this hypothesis of after-the-fact rationalization: if 
consulting information led to higher rates of testing based on information discovered in those sources, 
then it would presumably matter whether one weighed those factors or decided in some other way.  The 
seventh pair shows that, among those who consulted written sources, there is nearly the same rate of 
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PSA testing between those who weighed pros and cons (9 out of 9) and those who did not (10 out of 
11).  Finally, the last pair of rows in Table 7 indicates that consistency of beliefs, once again, plays a 
very limited role in explaining PSA decisions, revealed by similar rates of PSA taking among perfect 
Bayesians and extreme deviators (i.e., Emersonians). 
Section 5: Discussion 
Findings 
The first objective was to elicit belief data in way that would provide independent measures of 
consistency (with respect to Bayes’ Rule) and the objective accuracy of subjective beliefs.  Our 
elicitation technique gives respondents two unconditional probabilities and then elicits related 
conditional probabilities to accomplish this objective.  The second objective was to document evidence 
consistent with economic losses due to inconsistent beliefs.  The data we collected revealed no positive 
correlation between consistency and accuracy, implying that inconsistent beliefs did not generate 
economic losses by reducing the accuracy of beliefs, at least in the context we studied.  The other 
channel capable of signaling the economic losses would have been a strong conditional effect of 
inconsistency on the probability of getting a PSA test, which we also did not find.  Finally, we 
estimated a linear probability model of men’s decisions about PSA testing and found that subjective 
beliefs about risks, benefits and costs are jointly non-predictive.  Just about any variable that belongs in 
a standard expected utility model failed to predict PSA decisions.  However, once information about 
social influences was added to the empirical model, the subjective beliefs became jointly statistically 
significant, and the model’s sign pattern became amenable to straightforward interpretations. 
With full awareness of the usual caveats needed in interpreting self-reports about issues as 
personal as medical decision making, we asked respondents how much written information they had 
acquired, the sources of that information, and whether or not they had weighed pros and cons in 
deciding whether to have a PSA test.  More than half said they had not weighed pros and cons.  Insofar 
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as the standard information processing model provides a poor fit of the data, one may rightfully ask 
whether these data are simply too noisy to reveal real underlying statistical links.  We argue, on the 
contrary, that respondents’ self-reported PSA decisions become intelligible, with acceptable levels of 
model fit, under the alternative hypothesis that economists, like many people, sometimes rely on a 
simple heuristic of following doctors’ advice—especially when sitting in a hospital or doctor’s office—
which could be referred to as a white-coat heuristic:  See a white coat, do what it says.  The social 
influencer indicator variables, especially doctor influenced, add significant predictive power.  Whether 
trusting one’s doctor is effective in any normative sense is not addressed by our findings.    
Why Economists? 
To improve the chances of finding empirical links between logical consistency and objective 
accuracy of beliefs, the data reported in this paper were collected mostly from economists.  Gaechter, 
Orzen, Renner, and Starmer (2009) argue that empirical findings of anomalous behavior in samples of 
economists are especially convincing, since one would expect economists’ professional training to 
sensitize them to mechanisms causing these effects.  Presumably the self-awareness of economists 
makes anomalous effect sizes smaller than in the general population and therefore those effects can be 
interpreted as conservative lower bounds.  Our sample size of 133 was comparable to theirs, which 
was120.  Previous studies have shown that economists behave differently from non-economists 
because of both selection and training (Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993; 
Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen, 1996).  Surveys of economists have also shown that economists’ 
statistical reasoning and policy views differ substantially from those of non-economists, even after 
controlling for education, income and gender (Caplan, 2001, 2002; Blendon et al., 1997).  Also 
relevant to the medical decision-making data studied in this paper is previous survey evidence showing 
that economists agree more than non-economists on the determinants of health and healthcare 
expenditures (Fuchs, Krueger and Porterba, 1998).  Perhaps the most compelling reason for studying 
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economists is that their beliefs about statistical and medical concepts can be measured with far less 
noise than in the general population, whose poor understanding of statistics and “health literacy” is 
well documented (Williams et al., 1995; Baker et al., 1998; Parker et al., 1995; Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2009).   
Logical consistency undoubtedly enjoys objective normative status in particular task settings, 
for example, when taking the GRE exam.  However, a growing body of theoretical models suggests 
that deviations from standard normative axioms in economics, surprisingly perhaps, may have 
beneficial effects for individual and aggregate welfare.17 Historians of science have also pointed out 
that willingness to hold inconsistent views is a regularity rather than an exception among innovators, 
for example, Kitcher (1992, p.85), who writes: 
[O]n numerous occasions in the history of science, investigators have found themselves inclined to 
accept the members of a set of statements that they could recognize as jointly inconsistent, without 
knowing immediately what should be abandoned: Darwinian evolutionary theory survived Lord 
Kelvin's estimates of the age of the earth, Bohr's theory of the atom was retained and developed 
even though it was at odds with classical electromagnetic theory. The phenomenon should be 
apparent from humbler situations, in which people know that they are inconsistent but do not yet 
see the right way to achieve consistency. It may even be universal, if each of us is modest enough 
to believe that one of our beliefs is false." 
The conclusions we draw are not categorically against the real-world benefits of adhering to 
axioms of logical consistency.  Rather, our goal is to emphasize the importance of matching normative 
                                                 
17
 There is also a growing literature concerning benefits of inaccurate (distinguished here from inconsistent) beliefs.  
Complementing psychological studies of so-called self-serving bias, Samuelson and Swinkels (1996) report advantages 
in learning for those with distorted beliefs. Inflated beliefs about the value of one’s endowment can increase payoffs in 
bargaining (Dekel and Scotchmer, 1999; Heifetz and Spiegel, 2001; Heifetz and Segev, 2004).   Having a reputation for 
being illogical in financial markets can make it difficult for opponents to predict one’s actions (Kyle and Wang, 1997).  
And overconfidence in the advice of financial experts can increase market liquidity, resulting in equilibria with distorted 
beliefs that Pareto-dominate rational expectations (Berg and Lien, 2005; Berg and Gigerenzer, 2007).  Recently, Gilboa 
and Samuelson (2010) study a learning environment in which biased minds learn more effectively. 
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criteria to particular decision-making contexts, while providing a counterexample in which standard 
normative benchmarks are violated and performance is unchanged (if not improved).  Economists, who 
are presumably as familiar with the normative benchmarks as anyone, vary substantially in the degree 
to which they conform to consistency benchmarks, in the accuracy of their beliefs, and in the medical 
decisions they make.  And yet, statistical links between these different sources of variation are mostly 
weak. Descriptively, social influences appear to be at least an order of magnitude more important than 
the fundamentals of perceived risks and benefits of PSA screening.   
A Bolder Normative Economics in Which Inconsistency Is Allowed?18 
Our first finding, that consistency does not predict accuracy, suggests that the usual notions of 
axiomatic or consistency-based rationality are poor proxies for context-specific notions of rationality, 
sometimes referred to as ecological rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Smith, 2003).  The 
second finding that consistency is uncorrelated with actual decision outcomes (when taken together 
with the first) suggests that inconsistency in this domain has a small economic cost.  The third finding, 
that social influences are necessary to make sense of the empirical PSA decision model, reveals the 
importance of social cues.  Conditioning action on social cues no doubt functions well in many 
contexts, but is surprising in light of well-known incentive problems in doctor-patient transactions. 
Rubinstein (2006) expresses doubt that economic theory, normative or descriptive, serves the 
prescriptive function that many, if not most, economists have in mind when defending policy 
implications based on economic research.  Gintis (2010), while arguing for the centrality of the rational 
actor model, allows that it will be necessary and desirable to pursue extensions of standard notions of 
rationality in contexts that take us outside the small worlds to which the Bayesian model is applicable. 
With a slightly different take on the same theme, Gilboa (forthcoming) writes in support of pluralistic 
approaches rather than the one-axiom-fits-all-contexts approach to normative analysis, which is 
                                                 
18
 See Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) on narrow normative interpretations of rationality axioms in behavioral economics. 
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prevalent if not dominant in both neoclassical and behavioral economics.  More explicitly, Gilboa, 
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2009, p. 288) write: 
We reject the view that rationality is a clear-cut, binary notion that can be defined by a simple set of 
rules or axioms.  There are various ingredients to rational choice.  Some are of internal coherence, 
as captured by Savage’s axioms.  Others have to do with external coherence with data and scientific 
reasoning.  The question we should ask is not whether a particular decision is rational or not, but 
rather, whether a particular decision is more rational than another.  And we should be prepared to 
have conflicts between the different demands of rationality.  When such conflicts arise, 
compromises are called for.  Sometimes we may relax our demands of internal consistency; at other 
times we may lower our standards of justifications for choices.  But the quest for a single set of 
rules that will universally define the rational choice is misguided. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued for a research program that maintains strict separation 
between normative and descriptive analysis, arranged in a clear hierarchy, with normative on top.  
Contemporary behavioral economics has enthusiastically undertaken this program whose ground rules 
hold that no descriptive finding is allowed to raise doubts about the normative authority of neoclassical 
rationality axioms.  Thaler (1991) had already taken up this program in 1991, going to great pains to 
reassure unconvinced readers that behavioral economics posed no threat to neoclassical norms and, in 
fact, had nothing to add to normative economics since it had already reached a state of perfection 
enjoying broad consensus among economists (Berg, 2003).  Tversky and Kahneman (1986), in the 
conclusion of their article, suggest a role for policy to help those who deviate from the normative 
model to conform. The notion that decision models should serve as tools for aiding real-world 
decisions is one that Rubinstein (2001, p. 618) rejects: “To draw an analogy, I do not believe that the 
study of formal logic can help people become `more logical’, and I am not aware of any evidence 
showing that the study of probability theory significantly improves people's ability to think in 
 33 
probabilistic terms.”  
 Some behavioral economists and their colleagues (e.g., Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 1998) invest 
a degree of faith in the prescriptive value of neoclassical rationality axioms that one rarely finds in the 
neoclassical literature, with calls for interventions to “de-bias” those of us who deviate from axiomatic 
rationality.  Behavioral economists’ frequent empirical investigation of “biases” and “deviations” from 
norms of rationality—expected utility violations, preference reversals, time inconsistency, and non-
Nash play in laboratory games—seems to harden the normative authority of neoclassical models.  
These models may be descriptively wrong, the thinking goes, but they nevertheless provide the reliable 
guidance about what people ought to do.   
Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003) show that many of the predictable properties of 
aggregate demand curves based on standard consumer theory need not be abandoned as empirical 
regularities, despite strong evidence refuting the axiomatic assumptions of the underlying model of 
consumer choice.  Even those of us whose policy preferences are influenced by the rich contributions 
of economic theory that motivates a role for government (e.g., based on externalities, market power, 
and information asymmetries) can enthusiastically join Libertarian critics such as Sugden (2008b), 
whose article titled, “Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism,” says it all.  He is, like we 
are, methodologically committed to challenging axiomatic rationality, which lies at the core of 
behavioral economics, without viewing descriptive or normative failures of rationality axioms as 
leading to new rationalizations for paternalistic policies (Sugden, 2004).   
This normative debate will, no doubt, continue.  We only wish to add an observation relevant 
for interpreting our finding that economists’ beliefs about PSA testing and the risks of prostate cancer 
typically violate the assumption of Bayesian rationality.  When  normative theory and observed 
behavior come into conflict, behavioral economics typically follows the research program laid out in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) by unequivocally attributing error  to the agent responsible for the 
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behavior.  That is, however, not the only valid deduction one can take away from this conflict between 
normative theory and observed behavior.  One can instead conclude that principles previously thought 
to have normative value are simply incomplete, or perhaps have a more limited range of applicability, 
than previously thought.   
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) put forward an analogy equating behavioral anomalies and 
optical illusions.  Behavioral anomalies are anomalies because they deviate from axiomatic normative 
decision theory.  Optical illusions are illusions because perceived distances deviate from objectively 
measured distance.  The implication is that the axiomatic foundation of normative decision theory is as 
solidly grounded as the measure of physical distance.   
Thaler  (1991, p. 138) writes, “It goes without saying that the existence of an optical illusion 
that causes us to see one of two equal lines as longer than the other should not reduce the value we 
place on accurate measurement. On the contrary, illusions demonstrate the need for rulers!” Yet, in 
documenting (again and again) that observed behavior deviates from the assumptions (and predictions) 
of expected utility theory, there is no analog to the straight lines of objectively equal length. Unlike the 
simple geometric verification of equal lengths against which incorrect perceptions may be verified, the 
fact that human decisions do not satisfy the axioms underlying expected utility theory in no way 
implies an illusion or a mistake. Expected utility theory is, after all, but one model of how to rank risky 
alternatives. We would make the modest suggestion that behavioral economics could benefit from 
boldly pursuing new normative criteria that more effectively classify different procedures for making 
decisions in a way that helps assess whether they are well-matched to the environment in which they 
are used, according to the principle of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Smith, 
2003). 
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individual characteristics
social influences
elicited probabilities
Mean 
Subjective 
Belief
Std 
Dev of 
Mean
Number of 
Responses
Published 
point-
estimates***
0.27 0.019 132 0.177
0.06 0.006 132 0.028
0.47 0.019 128 0.34
0.72 0.018 126 0.68
0.30 0.020 128 .020 to 0.29
Table 1: Survey responses
Fraction Yes Number of Responses
Keep $3 cash? 0.12 133
133
Chocolate? 0.17 133
Give $3 to charity? 0.71
Economist? 0.92 133
Work is applied as opposed to theoretical? 0.75 124
0.75 128
50 years old or older** 0.62 133
Neoclassical methodological orientation?*
PSA decision and recommendation
Did you have a PSA? 0.46 133
Would you recommend a PSA to men in their 50s? 0.91 124
information acquisition, perceived harms, and mode 
of information processing
Written info? 0.22 131
Medical journal? 0.05 131
Harms? 0.25 122
Weighed pros and cons? 0.36 128
Doctor influenced? 0.58 133
Spouse or relative influenced? 0.07 133
lifetime incidence Pr(C Lifetime)
lifetime mortality Pr(D Lifetime)
Nobody influenced? 0.15 133
posterior probability Pr(C|+)
sensitivity Pr(+|C)
incontinence probability Pr(Incontinence|Surgery)
*Other individual information was collected too, for example, subfield specialization indicators used 
as controls in some regressions reported below.  The sample of self-reported primary specializations 
consisted of 7 percent econometrics, 12 percent finance, 5 percent health economics, 7 percent 
economic history, 5 percent in industrial organization, and 9 percent macroeconomics.  No subfield 
indicator correlates with neoclassical methodological orientation by more than 0.12, and some, like 
econometrics and economic history, have slight negative correlations with the neoclassical indicator.  
**All 133 respondents reported their age in years, 119 of whom were 40 or older.  Mean self-reported 
age was 51 years old.  ***Stanford et al's (1999) NCI SEER study and Harris and Lohr (2002).
Journal Author(s) Comment
Archive of 
Internal 
Medicine
Concato, 
et al 
(2006)
"Measurement of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) in serum and digital rectal examination (DRE) are 
commonly used to screen for prostate cancer, yet official recommendations regarding these tests vary.  
For example, American Cancer Society and American Urological Association recommendations 
include screening for prostate cancer in men older than 50 years, using PSA testing and DRE, 
followed by transrectal ultrasound if either test result is abnormal.  In contrast, the American College 
of Physicians suggests counseling regarding possible benefits and risks, and the US Preventative 
Services Task Force found insufficient evidence to recommend screening.  These positions were 
promulgated in the setting of data showing that the screening tests increase detection of prostate 
cancer but without direct evidence showing that PSA or DRE reduce mortality."
Annals of 
Internal 
Medicine
Barry 
(2006)
"We already know that PSA screening has a substantial downside. . . .The poor specificity of PSA 
testing results in a high probability of false positives requiring prostate biopsies and lingering 
uncertainty about prostate cancer risk, even with initially negative biopsy findings.  Although we now 
know that aggressive surgical treatment of prostate cancers largely detected the "old fashioned way" 
without screening has a modest benefit, with about 18 cancers needing to be removed to prevent 1 
death over 10 years, that benefit comes at a considerable price in terms of sexual dysfunction and 
incontinence.  The key question is whether early detection and subsequent aggressive treatment of 
prostate cancers found through PSA screening prevents enough morbidity and mortality to overcome 
these disadvantages..."
Journal of the 
National 
Cancer 
Institute
Draisma 
et al 
(2003)
"Whether asymptomatic men benefit from screening for prostate cancer is an unresolved question."
New England 
Journal of 
Medicine
Steineck 
et al 
(2002)
Regarding watchful waiting versus other treatment options following a diagnosis of prostate cancer, 
the "alternatives are associated with complex and incommensurable outcomes, and each man must 
judge for himself which treatment is preferable."
European 
Journal of 
Cancer 
Ciatto et 
al (2000)
"The benefits of prostate cancer screening are just theoretical, thus far unknown, and the potential risk 
of adverse effects much more worrying than for breast cancer: screening as a current practice is 
unethical, and the practice of screening, at the moment, must be limited to experimental studies." [also 
see Ciatto (British Medical Journal, 2003)]
American 
College of 
Physicians
Concato 
(1999) "Routine PSA measurement without a frank discussion of the issues involved is inappropriate."
Epidemiology Gann (1997) 
"The most important question is whether the decline in [disease-specific] mortality* will be worth the 
cost--in terms of anxiety, excess biopsies, and even unnecessary surgery." [also see Gann et al 
(JAMA , 1995)]
Journal of the 
American 
Medical 
Association 
(JAMA)
Litwin et 
al (1995)
Regarding patients' treatment decisions and doctors' recommendations: "Little is known about how or 
why they make treatment decisions, how their quality of life is affected by therapy, or why physicians 
recommend one treatment vs. another."  Regarding costs and benefits: "The traditional Western 
medical perspective of maximizing survival at all cost is inadequate.  Indeed, the most rational 
approach to treating men with localized prostate cancer needs to include not only adding years to life, 
but also adding life to years."
Table 2: PSA controversy in the medical literature
*The most common recommendation appears to be that doctors should provide patients with information about the PSA test’s 
pros and cons and encourage patients to decide about PSA testing on an individual basis.   Medical communication experts refer 
to this as the balance-sheet approach, advocated for the purpose of encouraging patients to weigh costs and benefits rather than 
making automatic decisions in favor of screening or treatment (Concato, 1999; McFall and Hamm, 2003).  The National Cancer 
Institute (the cancer wing of the U.S. National Institutes of Health) explicitly recommends against routine screening of 
asymptomatic men, and its website (www.cancer.gov) states that men should consider costs and benefits before deciding on a 
PSA test.   In contrast, many hospitals and doctors adopt a policy of automatic screening, as is recommended by the American 
Cancer Society and the American Urological Association.  The recommendation to weigh costs and benefits before being tested is 
echoed in numerous medical journal articles, however, including most of those listed in Table 1. 
consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent
Grand 
Mean
24 Perfect 
Bayesians
101 
Deviators 
from 
Bayes
t 
stat
60 
strictly 
below 
median 
incon-
sistency
65 weakly 
above 
median 
incon-
sistency
t 
stat
36 weakly 
below 
25th 
percentile 
incon-
sistency
34 weakly 
above 
75th 
percentile 
incon-
sistency
t 
stat
80 
Ballpark 
Bayesians
45 
Emersonians
t 
stat
Measures of inaccuracy
inaccuaracy 0.99 1.26 0.90 1.7 1.08 0.87 1.6 1.26 0.77 2.5 1.08 0.78 2.2
signed inaccuracy 0.01 -0.56 0.16 -2.2 -0.12 0.15 -1.3 -0.45 0.04 -1.6 -0.14 0.32 -2.1
Log deviations of individual elicited beliefs
log(incidence/0.177) -0.06 -0.43 0.08 -1.7 -0.13 0.09 -1.0 -0.44 -0.04 -1.3 -0.11 0.15 -1.2
0.07 -0.69 0.23 -2.2 -0.11 0.21 -1.2 -0.48 0.11 -1.5 -0.18 0.48 -2.5
0.18 0.00 0.22 -2.1 0.11 0.23 -1.1 0.09 0.12 -0.2 -0.11 0.67 -7.9
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.0 0.11 0.02 1.5 0.13 -0.10 2.5 0.09 0.01 1.3
Measures of inconsistency
inconsistency 0.48 0.00 0.59 -- 0.12 0.81 -- 0.03 1.05 -- 0.34 0.73 --
signed inconsistency -0.17 0.00 -0.21 -- -0.06 -0.28 -- -0.02 -0.28 -- 0.14 -0.73 --
*Inaccuracy is the (within-individual) simple average of the four absolute log deviations. Signed inaccuracy is the simple average of those same log 
deviations without taking absolute values.  **Inconsistency is the absolute log-approximated percentage error of the elicited ratio, 
posterior/sensitivity, relative to the correct ratio of 1/2. Signed inconsistency is the same as inconsistency but without absolute values.
Table 3: Contrasts in mean inaccuracy between consistent and inconsistent subsamples
log(mortality/0.028)
log(posterior/0.34)
log(sensitivity/0.64)
predictors coef t
consult written?(1/0) 0.35 2.0
consult med j?(1/0) -0.31 -0.9
procon?(1/0) -0.40 -2.8
times guess 50 (2,1,0) -0.10 -1.1
nobody influenced?(1/0) 0.10 0.5
doctor influenced?(1/0) -0.07 -0.4
age -0.08 -1.2
age squared 0.00 1.3
psa (1/0) 0.04 0.3
cash (1/0) -0.13 -0.7
chocolate (1/0) -0.02 -0.1
noneconomist (1/0) 0.33 1.1
neoclassical?(1/0) -0.31 -2.0
applied?(1/0) -0.02 -0.1
econometrics(1/0) -0.36 -1.3
finance(1/0) -0.01 0.0
health economics(1/0) -0.26 -0.9
history(1/0) -0.08 -0.3
industrial organization(1/0) 0.42 1.3
labor(1/0) 0.48 2.1
macroeconomics(1/0) -0.08 -0.3
inconsistency -0.08 -0.6
constant 3.11 2.0
R2
Sample Size 117
Table 4: Regression of inaccuracy
0.24
predictors coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t coefficient t
log(incidence/0.177) 0.05 1.0 0.07 1.4 0.04 0.9 -0.11 -2.4
log(mortality/0.028) -0.01 -0.3 0.00 0.1 0.01 0.3 0.10 2.8
log(posterior/0.34) -0.09 -1.6 -0.06 -0.9 -0.05 -0.7 -0.05 -0.7
log(sensitivity/0.64) 0.10 1.0 0.14 1.2 0.16 1.5 0.18 1.4
log(incontinence/0.150) -0.06 -1.6 -0.07 -1.7 -0.08 -2.3 -0.07 -2.7
age -0.03 -1.1 0.00 0.1 -0.02 -0.6 0.02 0.7
age squared 0.00 2.0 0.00 0.6 0.00 1.3 0.00 -0.7
cash?(1/0) -0.15 -1.5 -0.17 -2.0 -0.10 -0.9
chocolate?(1/0) -0.08 -0.7 -0.09 -0.8 -0.08 -0.9
procon?(1/0) -0.06 -0.6 -0.04 -0.4 -0.05 -0.6
consult written?(1/0) 0.14 1.5 0.15 1.6 0.13 1.4
inconsistency 0.01 0.2 0.00 0.1 -0.02 -0.3
nobody influenced?(1/0) -0.09 -0.7 -0.17 -1.3
doctor influenced?(1/0) 0.27 2.9 -0.03 -0.3
constant 0.79 1.0 -0.09 -0.1 0.52 0.6 0.65 0.8
R2test stat for H0*
Pr(test stat>observed|H0)
Sample Size
PSA 
Recommendation
Table 5: Estimated linear probability models for the PSA decision and PSA recommendation 
*H0 is the joint hypothesis that the first five variables, which proxy for perceived costs and benefits, 
have zero effect on the probability of having (or recommending) a PSA.  The test statistic is distributed 
as F(5, sample size minus number of regressors) under the null.  
0.18
.00
0.01
114
0.34
.00 0.38
121 114 114
0.13 0.14 0.03
Empirical Models of the PSA Decision:
fundamental add info- add influencers
0.46
no yes no response Total
no 59 [25]* 30 [16] 3 [1] 92 [42]
yes 16 [9] 12 [7] 2 [1] 30 [17]
no response 7 [2] 4 [0]  0 [0] 11 [2]
Total 82 [36] 46 [23] 5 [2] 133 [61]
Table 6: Cross-tabulation of harms of PSA and weighing pros and cons
*Bracketed counts refer to the number of respondents in each cell who reported having had 
a PSA.
Would you say you weighed pros 
and cons in making your decision 
about whether to have a PSA?
In your opinion are there 
potential harms associated 
with PSA screening?  
Among those who: yes no fraction yes
4 7 0.36
43 12 0.78
26 8 0.76
16 4 0.80
31 20 0.61
22 7 0.76
16 21 0.76
6 7 0.86
7 4 0.64
6 1 0.86
34 28 0.55
19 1 0.95
10 1 0.91
9 0 1.00
10 4 0.71
18 11 0.62
perfect Bayesians
Emersonian (severe violations of probability theory)
somebody influences & weigh pros and cons
report that someone influences them
somebody influences & NOT weigh pros and cons
consult written sources & weigh pros and cons
*Among respondents age 50 and over, there were three who would not say 
whether they weighed pros and cons or not.  Among these three, one 
reported having taken a PSA and two reported having taken no PSA.  
Under the heading "Took PSA and 50+?," those three non-responders (on 
the pros-versus-cons sample item) explain why the sums of "no"s and 
"yes"s across the "do NOT weigh pros and cons" and "weigh pros and 
cons" rows do not quite equal that of the row labeled "Among all."  A 
similar explanation applies to the columns under the heading "Recommend 
PSA?" **Among the 29 respondents who said they consulted written 
information, 14 said they did not weigh pros and cons, and 15 said they did. 
***The overall rate of PSA taking among respondents 50 and older was 65 
percent.
weigh pros and cons*
do NOT weigh pros and cons & report harms
weigh pros and cons & report harms
do not consult written sources**
consult written sources & NOT weigh pros and cons
weigh pros and cons & report NO harms
weigh pros and cons & report harms
consult written sources**
Table 7: PSA decisions broken out by information sources and self-
reported information processing
do NOT weigh pros and cons*
report that nobody influences them
Took PSA and 
50+?***
Prostate 
Cancer
No Prostate 
Cancer
P(C) = 0.025 1-P(C) = 0.975
+ PSA 
Test
- PSA 
Test
P(+) = 0.050 1-P(+) = 0.950
Cancer -PSANo Cancer +PSA
P(C|+)i = ? 1-P(C|+) P(C|-) 1- P(C|-)
Figure 1: Given the unconditional probability of a positive PSA test, P(+), and the unconditional
probability of prostate cancer, P(C), two conditional beliefs are elicited: the posterior 
probability P(C|+)i and sensitivity P(+|C)i
No CancerCancer
elicited 
conditional
belief
+PSA -PSA-PSA +PSA
P(+|C)i = ? 1-P(+|C) P(+|~C) 1- P(+|~C)
elicited 
conditional
belief
Figure 2: Inconsistency versus Inaccuracy (N=125)
*Bivariate regression line: inaccuracy = 1.00 - 0.06*inconsistency.  Because inconsistency 
and inaccuracy are defined as log deviations, the coefficient -0.06 can be interpreted as the 
elasticity of absolute inaccuracy (percentage-point deviation from published incidence and 
mortality rates) with respect to inconsistency (absolute percentage-point deviation from Bayes 
Rule).  Simple correlation is -0.042.  
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Appendix 1: Survey Instrument 
1. I’m conducting a survey about health decisions among 
economists and the first question is whether you’d like $3 
or a Swiss chocolate. 
Three dollars for charity □        Chocolate □ 
Three dollars for self □ 
2. Are you an economist? Yes□                         No□ 
3. What’s your subfield (within economics)?  
4. Would you say your professional work in economics is 
more theoretical or applied? 
Theoretical□     Applied□ 
The main focus of the survey is prostate cancer and PSA (Prostate Specific Antigen) screening. I won’t ask any 
personal questions about the illness itself, just about screening.  I’d like to elicit your best guesses about the 
risks of prostate cancer.   
5. For a randomly drawn American male, I’d like you to guess 
the probability that he will be diagnosed with prostate cancer 
in his lifetime?  
 
6. What would you say is the probability that he will die from 
prostate cancer in his lifetime?  
 
Now I’m going to ask you about American males in their 50s who have no symptoms, have never been diagnosed with 
prostate cancer, and are screened with a PSA test for the very first time.   One leading study suggests that 5% of 
randomly sampled men from this population have a positive PSA.  It’s also estimated that 2.5% actually have prostate 
cancer at the time of screening, which includes those whose PSAs failed to detect the disease.  [source: Harris et al, 
2002, Ann Intern Med] 
7. Given a positive PSA, I’d like you to estimate the probability 
that a man actually has prostate cancer.   
 
8. And given cancer at the time of screening, what would you 
say is the probability of a positive PSA?   
 
9. In your opinion are there potential harms associated with 
PSA screening?  If so, what are they? 
Yes□                        No□                          
Potential harms include: 
10. Now I’d like you to consider a man in his 50s whose PSA test 
detected prostate cancer and who was treated with surgery.  
What would you guess is the probability that he will suffer 
from incontinence as a result of the treatment? 
 
11. Did you ever have a PSA screening for prostate cancer? 
If yes, how many times? 
Yes□                        No□           # times 
_______  
12. Whose views contributed to your decision about whether 
to have the PSA screening?  
 
13. Did you consult any written sources of information in 
making your decision?  
 
14. Did you consult any authoritative medical sources such as 
medical journals? If so, which source(s)? 
Yes□                           No□  
Sources: 
15. Would you say you weighed pros and cons in making your 
decision about whether to have a PSA? 
Yes□                               No□ 
16. Would you recommend that men in their 50s take a PSA? Yes□                               No□ 
17. How old are you? ______ years old, or: 
□ age<40, □40-49, □50-59, □60-69, 70+□ 
18. Would you consider yourself a neoclassical economist?   Yes□                                 No□ 
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Appendix 2: Signed Versus Absolute Measures of Inconsistency and Inaccuracy, and 
Interpretation of Units in the Log Approximation 
So far, deviations have been computed using absolute value.  Signed versions of 
inconsistency and inaccuracy were constructed to see if useful information might be 
contained in the signs of deviations. We constructed an analogous pair of variables, signed 
inconsistency and signed inaccuracy, with identical definitions to inconsistency and 
inaccuracy, but without absolute values.  The Figure in Appendix 3 shows empirical 
distributions for signed inaccuracy, inaccuracy, signed inconsistency and inconsistency.   
A few examples help interpret the units of inaccuracy and inconsistency. An 
individual with inaccuracy = 0.10 provided mortality and incidence beliefs that were, on 
average, 10 percent too large or too small.  The log approximations of percentage deviations 
become imprecise for large deviations. For example, the individual in our sample with 
signed inaccuracy =-3.9 reported mortality and incidence beliefs that were 2 percent of 
published point estimates, that is, 98 percent too small rather than “390 percent too small,” 
since -3.9 =  log(0.02).  The exact percentage deviation, [(incidence/0.177 -1) + 
(mortality/0.028-1)]/2, has an empirical range of -0.98 to 9 (i.e., some respondents’ beliefs 
are 98 percent too small while others have beliefs that are 900 percent too large).   
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Appendix 3: Empirical distributions of unsigned inaccuracy, unsigned inconsistency, 
inaccuracy and inconsistency 
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Appendix 4: Natural Frequencies 
No Natural Frequency Effect 
Previous studies have documented large differences in decisions resulting from logically 
equivalent representations of statistical information (e.g., the framing effect in Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986).  Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, 1999) showed that communicating 
probabilities in natural frequencies (e.g., “7 in 1000” versus “0.7 percent”) can lead to dramatic 
improvements in Bayesian reasoning.  Our interview protocol alternated between two versions of 
the interview script which varied the way that probabilities were communicated to, and elicited 
from, respondents.  In the probability treatment, respondents were told that “2.5 percent have 
prostate cancer,” whereas in the natural frequency treatment they were told that “25 in 1000 have 
prostate cancer.”   
Counter to our expectations, the data showed virtually no treatment effect.  In hindsight, 
we might have expected no effect because of a key difference between our elicitation and those 
for which large treatment effects have been shown previously.  An important advantage of 
natural frequencies is that the reference class is held constant, making conditional probabilities 
easier to understand for those without statistical training (e.g., “50 in 1,000 had a positive PSA 
and 17 of those 50 actually had cancer” may be easier to understand than “the probability of a 
positive PSA is 0.05 and the probability of cancer conditional on a positive PSA is 0.34 
[=17/50]”).  Our elicitation scheme, however, switched between three different reference classes: 
1,000 randomly drawn U.S. adult males (when eliciting incidence and mortality); 1,000 
randomly drawn 50-year-olds without any symptoms or history of prostate cancer being screened 
for the first time (when eliciting posterior probability and sensitivity); and 1,000 randomly drawn 
U.S. males who have been diagnosed with prostate cancer and treated with surgery (when 
eliciting the probability incontinence).  Because the reference classes change, it is little surprise 
that natural frequencies did not improve Bayesian reasoning.  On the other hand, it could be that 
economists’ specialized training enabled them to interpret probabilistic and natural frequency 
representations more or less equivalently.   
 
 
